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1 Introduction
Lifelong learning is high on the policy agenda. Societal and technological changes
increase the need to invest in lifelong learning. For example, eective retirement ages in
developed economies have risen dramatically over the past decade.1 Also, technological
change and globalization seem to reduce the lifespans of sectors, rms and products
(Goos et al., 2014; Michaels et al., 2014). As a result, individuals are more likely
to switch jobs and careers during their (prolonged) working life, and are more likely
to switch tasks within a given job. In the face of these changes, maintaining and
investing in human capital during working life becomes increasingly important. At the
same time, policymakers worry that individuals and/or their employers underinvest in
lifelong learning, due to e.g. hold-up problems (Malcomson, 1997, 1999).2 Although
it is dicult to determine empirically whether there is underinvestment in lifelong
learning in general, policymakers seem particularly worried about certain subgroups
of the population that have a distaste for formal learning, such as lower educated
individuals (see e.g. the Adult Education Survey) and that work in sectors that seem
particularly `at risk' by technological change and globalization.
Policymakers therefore try to mitigate potential underinvestment in lifelong learn-
ing. Governments provide nancial support to employees or their employers that un-
dertake lifelong learning, they regulate and fund post-initial education and training,
inform employees and their employers about the possibilities for lifelong learning and
scrutinize their labor market regulations for adverse side eects. Recently, a literature
has emerged that investigates the eectiveness of dierent policy measures. However,
so far only direct nancial support measures have been investigated systematically and
even then the empirical evidence on the eectiveness of this type of policy remains
scarce. On the prospects for tax incentives to stimulate lifelong learning we know very
little.
In this paper we study whether a tax deduction for post-initial education can stim-
ulate investment in lifelong learning. Specically, we consider the eect of a tax deduc-
tion in the Netherlands, where individuals can deduct their expenditures on post-initial
work-related training and education from their pre-tax personal income. Jumps in
marginal tax rates provide exogenous variation in the nancial incentives to undertake
1The Netherlands is no exception and the current 30-year olds are expected to retire beyond their
70th birthday.
2Though studies have also identied factors that may mitigate this hold-up problem, like reciprocity
and smart contract designs (Leuven et al., 2005; Homan and Burks, 2013).
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lifelong learning. We study the eect of this exogenous variation on the probability
of ling lifelong learning expenditures and on the amount of lifelong learning expendi-
tures, for dierent subgroups and at dierent points in the income distribution.
We employ a regression kink and a regression discontinuity design to estimate the
causal impact of the tax deduction on lifelong learning expenditures. The Dutch income
tax system features two discontinuous jumps in the marginal tax rate. Moving from the
left to the right of the discontinuity, the upward jump in the marginal tax rate implies
a lower eective cost for lifelong learning to the right of the discontinuity. We prefer
the regression kink design, which we can apply to singles, as the necessary conditions
are met for this group. For couples however, we observe bunching at the kink, which
we address by estimating a so-called donut regression discontinuity.
In the empirical analysis we use a high quality administrative dataset of tax returns
on the universe of Dutch taxpayers for the years 2006{2013. This dataset provides in-
formation on all relevant earnings activities of the Dutch population, and also contains
all the information on tax deductions. A particularly unique feature of the dataset is
that it contains information on the amount spent by each scal partner, and on the
amount led by each partner after they potentially shift part of the expenditures to
the partner with the highest marginal rate.
Our main ndings are as follows. First, for singles we nd heterogeneous eects of
the tax deduction on the probability to le lifelong learning expenditures and on the
amount of lifelong learning expenditures.3 The eect at the kink at a relatively low
level of income (approximately 18 thousand euro) is essentially zero. The eect at the
kink at a relatively high level of income (approximately 55 thousand euro) is bigger: the
probability to le expenditures on post-initial training increases by 10%. Second, for
couples, for individuals that earn more than their partner (primary earners) we initially
nd large eects on the probability to le lifelong learning expenditures and the average
amount led. For individuals that earn less than their partner (secondary earners) we
initially nd counterintuitive negative eects. However, we show that these results
are biased due to the shifting of the lifelong learning expenditures between partners.
Third, when we consider the actual individual lifelong learning expenditures of each
partner, and leave out the bins with excessive mass close to the tax bracket thresholds,
we indeed nd smaller eects for primary earners, and the eect becomes close to zero
for secondary earners.
3Our sample of singles includes both singles without children and `singles' with children (single
parents). What is important for our analysis is that singles have no scal partner.
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Our analysis makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we con-
tribute to the very small literature on the causal eects of tax incentives for lifelong
learning. We build on the analysis by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2012), but make sub-
stantial improvements. The authors use a sample of about 100 thousand Dutch tax
returns, of which only a subsample of individuals is close to the relevant tax bracket
thresholds. Our paper uses about 10 million tax returns. Furthermore, we estimate
separate regressions for singles and primary earners (in couples), and take manipula-
tion of the running variable into account. Finally, for couples, we have the amount of
lifelong learning expenditures before and after scal partners shift their lifelong learn-
ing expenditures, whereas Leuven and Oosterbeek (2012) only had access to data on
nal lifelong learning expenditures led. Our analysis shows that ignoring shifting of
expenses between partners leads to spurious large estimates for primary earners and
spurious negative estimates for secondary earners. The only other paper, to the best
of our knowledge, to directly study the eectiveness of tax stimuli for lifelong learning
is by the same authors. In this paper Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) focus on a tax
incentive for lifelong learning directed at employers instead of employees. Specically,
they nd that a tax advantage for training activities for workers over the age of 40
only shifted training expenses from employees just before 40 to those just over 40, with
little to no eect on overall training expenses.
Second, we contribute to the general literature on the causal impact of nancial in-
centives on lifelong learning. These papers typically nd positive but limited responses
to these subsidies. For example, Schwerdt et al. (2012) investigates a general voucher
program in Switzerland, Hidalgo et al. (2014) look at a voucher program for specic
sectors in The Netherlands and Gorlitz and Tamm (2016) analyze a large co-nancing
instrument in Germany. In all cases, employees could pick a short training program
at lower than regular costs. Training participation was increased by these subsidies
between 13 to 20 percentage points. Interestingly however, no wage or employment
eects were found for those lucky enough to obtain the subsidy. Furthermore, Schw-
erdt et al. (2012) also considers heterogeneous treatment eects and nds that lower
educated individuals seem to benet somewhat more by participating in additional
training in terms of higher wages. Other papers in this literature investigate policies
in which employers receive (part of) the subsidy directly (Gorlitz, 2010; Abramovsky
et al., 2011; Van der Steeg and van Elk, 2015).
Also, the results of our paper are related to a relatively new literature on the causal
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eects of tax incentives for initial education, most often used for the education of
the children of relevant taxpayers (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2016). In countries
with many private schools tuition expenses can be substantial and sometimes the tax
authorities are subsidizing these expenditures directly. Also savings for future college
tuition expenditures are in certain cases deductible. These tax subsidies are both
meant to increase private school and college attendance, and to give income support
to low- and middle income families with kids. A few papers have been able to identify
causal eects on higher education participation and these papers found small eects of
these tax subsidies at best. Bulman and Hoxby (2015) nd negligible eects on several
outcomes in higher education of three tax credits for households who pay tuition and
fees. Hoxby and Bulman (2016) argue that this might be due to the price inelasticity
of marginal households, but that limited knowledge about the deduction and the delay
in receiving the nancial benet also matter.
In our conclusion we try to explain the heterogeneous eects of the tax deduction
on dierent income groups. We argue that frictions or a lack of salience of the tax
deduction are unlikely to play a major role in the heterogeneous eect on lifelong
learning as there are substantial number of tax payers that le small amounts around
both kinks. A more plausible explanation for the heterogeneous eects would be that
for low-income individuals there are substantial other than nancial costs to post-initial
education, like time constraints and psychic costs. Moreover, low-income individuals
may be more myopic or are perhaps more likely to underestimate the gains of lifelong
learning.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of relevant
elements of the Dutch income tax system and the tax deduction for lifelong learning.
Section 3 outlines a stylized life-cycle model that makes predictions about the rela-
tionship between the tax deduction and marginal tax rates and investments in lifelong
learning, which motivates the setup of our empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses our
empirical methodology. A description of the data set, including descriptive statistics, is
given in Section 5. Section 6 presents the main results as well as a number of robustness
checks. Section 7 discusses our ndings and concludes.
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2 The tax deduction for lifelong learning
We exploit dierences in marginal tax rates to identify the eect of the tax deduction
on lifelong learning expenditures. In this section we discuss how the tax deduction for
lifelong learning works and outline the relevant characteristics of the Dutch income tax
system for our sample period (2006 { 2013).
The tax deduction for lifelong learning is an income tax deduction for expenditures
on post-initial schooling. Out-of-pocket expenses can be deducted from taxable income.
The resulting nancial gain of the tax deduction is equal to the expenditures (minus
a threshold) multiplied by the marginal income tax rate. The marginal income tax
rate is a step-wise increasing function of individual taxable income. Table 1 shows
the marginal tax rates and tax brackets for the period 2006 { 2013. The dierence
between the tax rates in the rst and second bracket uctuates somewhat around 8
percentage points over the period 2006 to 2012. The marginal tax rate for the rst
bracket was increased sharply in 2013. The dierence between the tax rates in the
third and fourth bracket is 10 percentage points throughout the entire time period.
The beginning and end of the tax brackets have changed very little, they are indexed
with ination, except in 2013, when the end of the rst bracket increased somewhat,
while the end of the second and third brackets decreased somewhat. The change in the
tax rates and tax brackets in 2013 are two reasons why we exclude 2013 from our main
analyses, in addition to the changes in the deduction for lifelong learning expenditures
in 2013 discussed below.
Lifelong learning expenditures are only deductible if the goal is to stimulate human
capital formation or to improve one's labour market position. This includes for exam-
ple tuition fees, books, necessary clothing and depreciation on a computer when the
computer is necessary for a work-related course. Living and travel expenses are ex-
cluded, and expenditures on courses for strictly personal development, `hobbies' and on
materials used for full self-tuition are excluded as well. Furthermore, untaxed benets
for lifelong learning, such as a study grant from the government or a private institution,
or a reimbursement from an employer for training expenses, should be subtracted from
the deducted amount. Over the period 2006 { 2012, a threshold of 500 euro applied to
all deductible lifelong learning expenditures in a given year. The maximum deductible
amount each year was (and is) 15,000 euro.
The deductible for lifelong learning expenditures changed quite substantially in
2013. First, the threshold was reduced from 500 euro to 250 euro. Second, the de-
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Table 1: Marginal tax rates and income brackets: 2006 - 2013
First bracket Second bracket Dierence Third bracket Fourth bracket Dierence
Bracket tax rate (%)
2006 34.15 41.45 7.30 42.00 52.00 10.00
2007 33.65 41.40 7.75 42.00 52.00 10.00
2008 33.60 41.85 8.25 42.00 52.00 10.00
2009 33.50 42.00 8.50 42.00 52.00 10.00
2010 33.45 41.95 8.50 42.00 52.00 10.00
2011 33.00 41.95 8.95 42.00 52.00 10.00
2012 33.10 41.95 8.85 42.00 52.00 10.00
2013 37.00 42.00 5.00 42.00 52.00 10.00
Top of the tax bracket (euro)
2006 17,046 30,631 52,228 1
2007 17,319 31,122 53,064 1
2008 17,579 31,589 53,860 1
2009 17,878 32,127 54,776 1
2010 18,218 32,738 54,367 1
2011 18,628 33,436 55,694 1
2012 18,945 33,863 56,491 1
2013 19,645 33,363 55,991 1
ductible became limited to tuition fees and compulsory additional learning tools, such
as books and protection materials. This meant for example that the depreciation of
a computer was no longer deductible. These changes provide another reason why we
limit ourselves to the 2006 { 2012 period in our main analyses.
While training expenditures are typically individual expenditures, partners can
choose whether they deduct the expenditures from their own taxable income or whether
they transfer the expenditures to their partner who can then subtract it from his or her
taxable income. To minimize the household tax burden, partners typically shift the tax
deductions to the partner that has the higher marginal tax rate (see Section 5). The
threshold of 500 euro must rst be applied to each partner's personal expenditures
before the expenditures can be shifted between partners. For couples we use data
on personal or `own' expenditures and data on declared expenditures to show the
importance of accounting for the shifting behaviour.
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3 Theoretical framework
Following Leuven and Oosterbeek (2012), we illustrate the basic mechanism via which
a tax deduction for lifelong learning expenditures in combination with dierences in
marginal tax rates aects the investment in lifelong learning in a stylized life-cycle
model.
Lifetime utility depends on consumption in period 1 and 2: U(C1; C2). We assume
that the utility function is additively separable in period 1 utility and period 2 utility,
and period 2 utility is discounted by a factor 1=(1 + ), where  is the subjective
discount rate:
U(C1; C2) = U(C1) +
1
1 + 
U(C2): (1)
Consumption in period 1 depends on gross income w1, lifelong learning expenditures
L, the tax rate 1 and savings S:
C1 = (1  1)(w1   L)  S; (2)
noting that lifelong learning expenditures are deducted from gross income rather than
net income. Also note that for simplicity we assume that agents face a at tax system.
Consumption in period 2 then depends on gross income w2, the return on lifelong
learning expenditures, the tax rate 2 and the return on period 1 savings:
C2 = (1  2)(w2 + f(L)) + (1 + r)S; (3)
where f(L) is the return on lifelong expenditures in terms of a higher gross period 2
income, for which we assume f(0) = 0, f 0 > 0 and f 00 < 0, and r is the return on
savings.
Maximizing lifetime utility with respect to lifelong learning expenditures and sav-
ings gives, respectively:
@U(:)
@L
= 0) U 0C1( (1  1)) +
1
1 + 
U 0C2(1  2)f 0(L); (4)
@U(:)
@S
= 0) U 0C1( 1) +
1
1 + 
U 0C2(1 + r): (5)
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Solving for L then gives the implicit function:
f 0(L) =
(1  1)
(1  2)
(1 + r)
(1 + )
: (6)
In the empirical application below we will compare individuals with a lower 1, with
a taxable income just below a tax bracket threshold, with individuals with a higher
1, with a taxable income just above a tax bracket threshold. Equation (6) shows
that ceteris paribus, individuals with a higher 1 will invest more in lifelong learning
than individuals with a lower 1. Indeed, when 1 is higher, the right hand side of
(6) is lower. Hence, at the optimum, f 0(L) will be lower as well, and given that
f 00(L) < 0, this implies that L should be higher. Intuitively, the investment cost of
lifelong learning is lower when 1 is higher. In the appendix we show that ceteris is
indeed very close to paribus, as individuals just below and above income tax bracket
thresholds are very similar in observable characteristics (and hence in r and  in terms
of our simple stylized model), and also face very similar tax rates 2 in years after the
lifelong learning investment.4
4 Empirical methodology
We apply a dierent empirical methodology for singles and couples. The tax deduction
introduces a kink in the eective costs of lifelong learning expenditures. Therefore we
prefer to use a regression kink design, provided that the conditions for using a regres-
sion kink design hold.5 A crucial condition for a regression kink design is that there
is no bunching around the kink. Below we show that this condition holds for singles,
but not for couples. As discussed in Section 2, couples can shift their lifelong learn-
ing expenditures between partners. Couples who minimize their joint tax burden will
generally shift deductibles to the partner with the highest marginal tax rate, which
will typically be the highest earning partner, until marginal tax rates are equal. This
means that the highest earner often ends up close to the beginning of a tax bracket.
This creates bunching at the kink, which invalidates the assumptions underlying the
4Note that when 1 = 2, lifelong learning expenditures do not depend on marginal tax rates
(Boskin, 1975; Eaton and Rosen, 1980; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2012). However, below we show that
this does not hold for large parts of the individuals in the sample. Indeed, the analysis rests on the
fact that 1 is dierent just below and above tax bracket thresholds, whereas 2 is very similar.
5See e.g. Card et al. (2015), Card et al. (2015) and Landais (2015) for an introduction to the
regression kink design methodology.
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regression kink design. For couples we therefore do not use a regression kink design.
Instead, we use a so-called donut regression discontinuity design.6 In the donut re-
gression discontinuity design we drop observations from income bins around the kink
for which we observe excess mass. The size of the donut in our preferred specication
(1,000 euro on either side of the kink) is so large that for the large majority of the
sample to the right of the kink included in the regression there is a xed dierence
or discontinuity (as opposed to a kink) in the nancial gain from the tax deduction.
Therefore, we apply a donut regression discontinuity design for couples.
4.1 Singles: regression kink design
For singles we exploit the dierences in the marginal tax rates in a regression kink design
to identify the causal eect of the tax deduction on lifelong learning expenditures. The
idea is that the outcome variable is a continuous function of income in the absence
of the tax deduction, but that the tax deduction in combination with a discontinuity
in the marginal tax rate creates an exogenous kink in the eective costs of lifelong
learning which potentially results in a kink in the use of and expenditures on lifelong
learning as well.
Figure 1 illustrates the kink when going from the third to the fourth bracket, located
at a taxable income of 52,000 euro. Suppose that an individual has 2,500 euro lifelong
learning expenditures. The marginal tax rate to the left of the kink is 42%. The
eective costs of the lifelong learning expenditures then are (1 0:42) (2; 500 500)+
500 = 1; 660 euro. When the individual has taxable income (before the tax deduction
is applied) in the fourth tax bracket, the eective costs of lifelong learning expenditures
are lower. For example, at 1,000 euro to the right of the threshold, the eective costs of
lifelong learning are (1 0:52)(2; 500 1; 500)+(1 0:42)(1; 500 500)+500 = 1; 560
euro, or 6% less than on the left-hand side of the threshold. Finally, for individuals
with a taxable income 2,000 euro to the right of the threshold and beyond, the eective
costs of lifelong learning are (1  0:52)  (2; 500  500)+ 500 = 1; 460 euro, or 12% less
than on the left-hand side of the threshold. This suggests running a regression kink
design using observations up to the point where the nancial gain attens out.
We estimate the eect of the tax deduction on i) the probablity of ling lifelong
6See e.g. Imbens and Lemieux (2008); Lee and Lemieux (2010) for an introduction to the regression
discontinuity design methodology, and Barreca et al. (2011, 2016); Hoxby and Bulman (2016) for an
introduction to and applications of the donut regression discontinuity design methodology.
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Figure 1: Eective costs of lifelong learning for gross costs of 2,500 euro
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learning expenditures, and ii) the amount of lifelong learning expenditures led (in-
cluding the zeros), using the following linear model:7
Yit =  + Rit + 1(Rit > 0) Rit + Xit + t + it; (7)
where i denotes the individual and t denotes calender year. Rit is (recentered) taxable
income before deducting lifelong learning expenditures, the parameter  measures the
treatment eect, the change in the slope at the kink. Xit are a set of demographic
control variables, t are year xed eects and it is the error term. To account for
correlation in the error term at a level higher than the individual we cluster our standard
errors at income groups of 100 euro (Bertrand et al., 2004; Donald and Lang, 2007).8
4.2 Couples: donut regression discontinuity design
Couples can manipulate their taxable income by shifting deductibles between scal
partners, including but not limited to the deduction for lifelong learning expenses.
In the empirical analyses we show that we indeed observe bunching at the cuto for
couples.9 To mitigate this problem we apply so-called donut regression discontinuity
7For the probability of ling lifelong learning expenditures this is a linear probability model (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009).
8Standard errors are very similar when we do not use cluster-robust standard errors, as we show
in the results section.
9Recall that we measure income before the deduction for lifelong learning expenditures is sub-
tracted. Hence, lifelong learning expenditures do not cause the bunching we observe in the data. The
bunching is caused by other deductibles that can be shifted between partners and that have already
11
regressions, where we drop selective observations around the cuto. We present results
for various sizes of the donut hole, including no donut hole as in the standard regression
discontinuity setup.
As discussed above, by applying a large donut hole in our previous specication,
we are basically left with a discontinuity in the eective costs of schooling between
those on the left and right hand side of the donut hole. This means that for couples
the \treatment eect" is measured for a discontinuity, where we compare those to the
right of the donut hole with those to the left. We therefore estimate the following
regression discontinuity model excluding the observations close to the threshold:
Yit =  + Rit + 1(Rit > 0)Rit + 1(Rit > 0) + Xit + t + it; (8)
where most terms are dened as above. The treatment eect  however, is now mea-
sured by the change in the intercept to the right of the threshold. Also for the donut
regression discontinuity design we use cluster-robust standard errors, clustered at in-
come groups of 100 euro.
5 Data
For the empirical analysis we use the universe of Dutch tax payers, available via the
remote access server of Statistics Netherlands. We have data for the period 2006 {
2013, but we focus on the period 2006 { 2012. During the period 2006 { 2012 the tax
deduction for lifelong learning expenditures remained largely unchanged.
We make the following selections. We drop all individuals younger than 25 years of
age or older than 60 years of age. Furthermore, we drop individuals who are enrolled at
a full-time higher education institution. Students can use the tax deduction for other
reasons than lifelong learning expenditures. We also exclude individuals on retirement
benets, on other types of social insurance and individuals without income, because
their demographic characteristics are quite dierent from the rest of the sample. Fi-
nally, for couples we only keep those where both partners are still in the sample after
we made the selections above.
As dependent variables we consider the take-up rate of the lifelong learning tax
been deducted from the income denition that we use. Specically, our running variable is taxable
individual income plus the deduction for lifelong learning expenditures. Individual gross incomes show
no bunching around the kinks, see the results section below.
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deduction and the deducted amount. We subtract the threshold of 500 euro from
the deducted amount before we calculate the take-up rate (dummy) and the deducted
amount.
Couples can shift the deductible amount from one partner to the other. When
the marginal tax rates dier, the household will be better o nancially when the
partner with the lower marginal tax rate shifts the lifelong learning expenditures to
the partner with the higher marginal tax rate. Indeed, this is what most couples do,
see Table 2. Close to 83% of people with a lower marginal tax rate than their partner
shift the lifelong learning expenditures to the partner with a higher marginal tax rate.
Therefore, for couples it is important to distinguish between what we denote as the
own deducted amount and the declared amount, where the latter includes the amount
(above the threshold) coming from or going to the other partner (hence the declared
amount can be higher or lower than the own amount).10
We study two discontinuities in marginal tax rates: 1) the increase in the marginal
tax rate when we move from the rst to the second tax bracket, which we indicate with
`kink 1', and 2) the increase in the marginal tax rate when we move from the third to
the fourth tax bracket, which we indicate with `kink 2'.
Descriptive statistics for singles are given in Table 3. In the rst column we present
descriptive statistics for the sample around kink 1. Specically, these are statistics for
the sample in our preferred specication with individuals from  1,330 to +1,330 euro
around kink 1. 2.9% of this sample deducts lifelong learning expenditures, and the
average amount deducted is almost 40 euro (including the zeros, the average amount
is 1,330 euro per person that uses the deduction). 66% of the sample around kink 1
are female, they are on average 40 years of age, have 0.8 children on average and 15%
of them has at least one parent born outside the Netherlands (`Foreign'). We have
about 660,000 observations in this sample. The second column gives the descriptive
statistics for the sample around kink 2 for our preferred specication with a bandwidth
of 2,000 euros around the kink. The take-up rate is higher for this group, 3.9%, and
the average amount is also higher at around 81 euro (including the zeros, the average
amount is 2,091 euro). There are fewer females in the sample around kink 2, 32%, on
average they are somewhat older, have fewer children and are less likely to be from
foreign parents. This sample is smaller, with close to 200,000 observations. These
individuals are already relatively high in the income distribution (approximately 10% of
10Typically the declared amount will be higher than the own amount for primary earners and lower
than the own amount for secondary earners.
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Table 2: Shifting of lifelong learning expenditures in couples (in %)
Marginal tax rate relative to partner No shifting Partial shifting Full shifting Total
Higher 89:7 8:8 1:6 100
Equivalent 54:0 22:2 23:7 100
Lower 7:6 9:6 82:8 100
Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for singles
Kink 1 Kink 2
Outcome variables
Deductible 0:0292 0:0390
(0:1684) (0:1936)
Deductible amount 39:2106 81:3248
(346:5883) (800:5169)
Control variables
Female 0:6565 0:3194
(0:4749) (0:4662)
Age 39:9325 43:5710
(9:8179) (9:1946)
Number of children 0:8397 0:4886
(0:9849) (0:8523)
Foreign 0:1470 0:0583
(0:3542) (0:2343)
Observations 663,368 197,584
Notes: Sample period 2006{2012. Standard devia-
tions reported in parentheses. Descriptives are pre-
sented for the preferred sample using a bandwidth
of 1,330 euros for kink 1 and 2,000 euros for kink 2.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for couples
Kink 1 Kink 2
Primary earner Secondary earner Primary earner Secondary earner
Outcome variables
Declared deductible 0:0260 0:0138 0:0381 0:0130
(0:1591) (0:1168) (0:1914) (0:1131)
Declared deducted amount 31:3919 12:8519 62:2872 16:1188
(276:3430) (168:7083) (503:0561) (229:1265)
Own deductible 0:0180 0:0191 0:0213 0:0284
(21:8619) (0:1368) (0:1444) (0:1662)
Own deducted amount 21:8619 22:3547 36:7184 41:6877
(168:7083) (233:5227) (417:4154) (367:8090)
Control variables
Female 0:2787 0:7255 0:1118 0:8868
(0:4483) (0:4463) (0:3152) (0:3169)
Age 38:7043 37:6005 44:9257 43:2654
(8:5814) (8:4261) (8:0111) (8:0296)
Number of children 1:3111 1:3111 1:4321 1:4321
(1:0226) (1:0226) (1:0761) (1:0761)
Foreign 0:1184 0:1207 0:0265 0:036
(0:3231) (0:3258) (0:1605) (0:1864)
Observations 498,627 498,627 756,617 756,617
Notes: Sample period 2006{2012. Standard deviations reported in parentheses. Descriptives are presented
for the baseline sample with a 1000 euro donut hole.
the population with income has income in the fourth (top) bracket in the Netherlands).
Descriptive statistics for couples are given in Table 4. We now present statistics
for the preferred sample using a bandwidth of 5,000 euro to the left and right of
the kink and applying a donut hole of 1,000 eurs to the left and to the right of the
kink. We present descriptives separately for primary and secondary earners. 2.6% of
primary earners around kink 1 declares lifelong learning expenditures, and on average
they declare 31 euro (1,208 euro per declaring person). The percentage of primary
earners declaring own lifelong learning expenditures is substantially lower at 1.8%, and
also the average amount is substantially lower at 21.9 euro (1,217 euro per declaring
person). Turning to the demographic control variables, only 28% of these primary
earners around kink 1 are female, the average age is close to 39 years of age, they have
1.3 children on average and only one in ten has foreign parents.
Secondary earners around kink 1 are less likely to declare lifelong learning expendi-
tures, only 1.4%, and on average they declare 13 euro (929 euro per declaring person).
However, the percentage of secondary earners declaring own lifelong learning expendi-
tures is actually somewhat higher than for primary earners, 1.9%, and also the average
amount is somewhat higher at 22.4 euro (1,171 euro per declaring person). Secondary
earners are more likely to be female, they are on average about a year younger than
the primary earners, have the same number of children and are about equally likely to
have foreign parents. We have about half a million couples in our preferred sample for
kink 1.
Moving to kink 2, we observe a much higher share of primary earners declaring
lifelong learning expenditures, 3.8%, at an average amount of 62 euro (1,635 euro per
declaring person). However, they are much less likely to declare own lifelong learning
expenditures, 2.1%, and also the average own amount of 36.7 euro is much smaller
(1,722 euro per declaring person). The large majority of these primary earners are
male, they are older than at kink 1, have about the same number of children and are
much less likely to have foreign parents. For secondary earners we again see a much
lower share declaring lifelong learning expenditures, 1.3%, with an average amount of
16 euro (1,244 euro per declaring person). However, the share of secondary earners
declaring own lifelong learning expenditures is again higher than for primary earners,
2.8%, with an average amount of 42 euro (1,466 euro per declaring person). These
secondary earners are predominantly female, are one and a half year younger than the
primary earners on average, have the same number of children, and are also not very
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likely to have foreign parents. For couples around kink 2 we have about three quarters
of a million observations.
Finally, in the stylized life-cycle model of Section 3 we assume that individuals dier
in their initial marginal tax rate, but that subsequent marginal tax rates are similar.
Figures A1a to A1d in the appendix show the marginal tax rate for individuals to the
left and to the right of the kink in 2006 in subsequent years, for each sample separately.
These gures show that marginal tax rates converge rapidly after 2006, and dierences
between marginal tax rates become small (in the order of 1%) in just 2 to 3 years and
remain small thereafter.
6 Results
6.1 Singles
First we consider the results for singles.11 Figure 2a and 2b present graphical evidence
for kink 1 and 2 respectively, on bunching (or heaping), and hence the potential role of
manipulation of the running variable. On the horizontal axis we have taxable income
plus the declared lifelong learning expenditures (potentially zero) relative to the kink,
using bins of 100 euro. On the vertical axis we have the density. At both kinks there is
no clear evidence of bunching, if anything there appears to be some excess mass only
at the rst bins of 100 euro next to the kink.12 This suggests that singles essentially
do not manipulate their income relative to these kinks.13 In addition, as discussed in
our theoretical model in Section 3, we need that marginal tax rates after investing in
lifelong learning are similar for those with initial tax rates above and below the kink.
Figures A1a and A1b in the appendix show for the 2006 sample that tax rates in later
years are very similar.
11Singles includes both singles without children and lone parents.
12Following McCrary (2008) and Cattaneo et al. (2017), we study the excess mass using a density
test. For kink 2 this gives a p-value for the null hypotheses of no excess mass of 0.21, 0.41 and 0.71
using the conventional, undersmoothed and robust-bias corrected of the Stata package rddensity. The
conventional approach may be asymptotically biased. The undersmoothed and robust-bias corrected
approaches try to correct for this bias in dierent ways. See Cattaneo et al. (2016, 2017) for more
detail. For kink 1 the p-values for the dierent methods are 0.07, 0.07 and 0.02 (the latter suggests
that there might be some excess mass at kink 1, but Figure 2a shows that the excess mass is small and
very local). Furthermore, there are no discontinuities in the demographic control variables around
kink 1 or 2 for singles, see Figure A4.
13Empirical studies looking at bunching at tax bracket thresholds typically nd little evidence of
bunching, at least for wage earners, see e.g. Kleven (2016) for an overview.
17
Figure 2c and 2d show the take-up rate of the deductible for schooling expenditures
(in excess of the minimum expenditure threshold) for kink 1 and 2, respectively. We
present averages per bin by income. The solid red lines gives the predicted take-up
rate, using a linear regression without demographic control variables, allowing for a
dierent slope to the right of the kink (regression kink design). The dashed red lines
give the corresponding 95% condence intervals.
Above the graph we report the corresponding coecient for the change in the slope
on the right-hand side. The graph and the estimated coecient suggest zero eect for
kink 1, but a positive and statistically signicant eect for kink 2. Figure 2e and 2f
plot the declared amount of schooling expenditures for singles around kink 1 and kink
2 (above the threshold, and including the zeros). Again, there is no apparent kink
in the relation between the declared amount and taxable income at kink 1, but there
is an apparent kink in the relation between the declared amount and taxable income
at kink 2. Furthermore, for kink 2, we also see a `attening out' of the eect on the
take-up rate and the deducted amount, which is consistent with the attening out of
the nancial gain to the right of the kink (see Section 4).
However, this is not controlling for demographic characteristics. Our simple theoret-
ical model suggests that it could be important to control for observable characteristics,
as it takes into account possible dierences between individuals with dierent marginal
tax rates. In Panel A in Table 5, we present regression results for the regression-kink
coecient (change in the slope) without and with demographic control variables and
for dierent bandwidths. Column (1) gives the results for the probability of using the
lifelong learning deduction without demographic control variables. For all bandwidths
we nd a small and statistically insignicant eect. The results are very similar when
we include demographic control variables in column (2). Our preferred specication
includes demographic control variables and uses a bandwidth of 1,330 euro. Here we
nd an eect of  0:0006. The running variable is in thousands of euro, hence the
interpretation is that the additional nancial gain of having an income 1,000 euro to
the right of the kink, leads to a (counterintuitive) drop in the take-up rate of the
lifelong learning deduction of  0:06 percentage points, but as noted above the eect
is not statistically signicantly dierent from zero. Our preferred bandwidth is 1,330
euro because this is the average amount of schooling expenditures deducted at 1,330
euro to the right of the kink, which is where the kink ends on average.14 Also for the
14Figure A8 in the appendix shows that the average amount of schooling expenditures is rather
stable over income bins. We do not exploit this `second kink' to the right of kink 1, where the
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Figure 2: Probability to use the deductible, the deducted amount and density around
the cuto for singles
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Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands. The regression lines are linear functions
without any control variables, with a separate intercept and slope on the right-hand side of the kink. Estimates for
kink 1 include observations from minus 1,330 to plus 1,330 euro relative to the kink. Estimates for kink 2 include
observations from minus 2000 to plus 2000 euro relative to the kink.
Table 5: Treatment eect estimates for singles on the probability to use the deductible
and the deducted amount (euros) using dierent bandwidths around the kink
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Use of the deductible Deducted amount
No controls Controls No controls Controls Observations
Panel A. Kink 1
Bandwidth
500 0:0003 0:0007  7:9404  7:4324 247,482
(0:0060) (0:0062) (10:4830) (10:5913)
1,000 0:0006 0:0007  2:2945  2:3580 496,957
(0:0015) (0:0016) (3:5096) (3:5187)
1,330  0:0014  0:0014  2:4042  2:4376 662,848
(0:0012) (0:0012) (2:4114) (2:3543)
1,500  0:0006  0:0006  1:4232  1:5225 749,526
(0:0011) (0:0011) (2:0498) (2:0209)
2,000  0:0003  0:0002  0:7834  0:6823 999,693
(0:0006) (0:0006) (1:5569) (1:5807)
Panel B. Kink 2
Bandwidth
1,000  0:0021  0:0012  7:7869  5:0908 99,566
(0:0033) (0:0031) (12:3768) (12:1285)
1,500 0:0024 0:0024 4:5190 4:8451 148,526
(0:0021) (0:0020) (6:5772) (6:5462)
2,000 0:0038 0:0038 5:5721 5:8728 197,584
(0:0011) (0:0010) (3:9432) (3:8610)
2,500 0:0031 0:0032 7:8314 8:0554 246,949
(0:0009) (0:0009) (3:3579) (3:3800)
Notes: Sample period 2006{2012. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by income bins of 100
euro in parentheses,  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1. All regressions include year xed eects.
The regressions with controls include gender, ethnicity, age, age2 and the number of children in
the household as demographic controls. Full estimation results for our preferred specication with
a bandwidth of 1,330 euro for Kink 1 and 2,000 euro for Kink 2 are reported in Table A2 in the
appendix. Results without clustering standard errors are reported in Table A3 in the appendix.
deducted amount we nd a small and insignicant (negative) eect, with and without
demographic control variables, see column (3) and (4) respectively.
Panel B in Table 5 gives the regression results for the regression-kink coecient
for kink 2, again without and with demographic control variables and for dierent
bandwidths. For kink 2 our preferred bandwidth is 2,000 euro, which is very close to
the average lifelong learning expenditures deducted to the right of the kink of 2,060
euro at 2,060 euro.15 For this bandwidth we nd a statistically signicant positive
eect of 0.38 percentage points, where again the running variable is measured in 1,000
euro. A bandwidth that is somewhat smaller or larger results in a somewhat lower
coecient, but not statistically signicantly dierent from our preferred bandwidth.
We can convert our preferred estimate to an elasticity of the probability of (de-
ducting) lifelong learning expenditures with respect to the eective costs of lifelong
learning expenditures. Consider an individual that has 2,500 euro in lifelong learn-
ing expenditures, or 2,000 euro above the threshold (which is close to the average
around kink 2). Furthermore, suppose that this individual has an income that is
1,000 euro to the right of the kink, which is in the middle of the region where the
nancial gain increases. For this individual we predict an increase in the take-up
rate of 0.38 percentage points, or about +10% relative to the baseline of 3.8 per-
centage points left of the kink. To the left of the kink the eective costs of 2,000
euro lifelong learning expenditures are (1   0:42)  (2; 500   500) + 500 = 1; 660
euro. 1,000 euro to the right of the kink the eective costs of lifelong learning are
(1  0:52)  (2; 500  1; 500) + (1  0:42)  (1; 500  500) + 500 = 1; 560 euro, or about
 6% relative to the eective costs left of the kink. The elasticity of the take-up rate of
(deducting) lifelong learning expenditures with respect to the eective costs of lifelong
learning expenditures is then +10%=( 6%)   1:7 with a 95% condence interval of
[ 0:8; 2:5].
The regression results for the average deducted amount for dierent bandwidths
for kink 2 are given in columns (3) and (4) of panel B, without and with demopgrahic
control variables respectively. Again, accounting for demographic control variables
hardly aects the results. For our preferred bandwidth of 2,000 euro, and including
demographic control variables, we nd a positive coecient of 5.9 euro. However, this
nancial gain is no longer increasing on average, because the exact location of this `second kink'
depends on the individual amount of lifelong learning expenditures, which varies across individuals
with the same income.
15Again we do not analyze the `second kink' where the average nancial gain is no longer increasing.
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coecient is not statistically signicant. Again, we can convert the estimate to an
elasticity. For an individual that has an income 1,000 euro to the right of the kink we
predict an increase in (deducted) lifelong learning expenditures of 5.9 euro, or about
+7% relative to the baseline of 79 euro to the left of the kink. Relating this to the
drop in the eective costs of lifelong learning expenditures of  6%, the elasticity of
(deducted) lifelong learning expenditures with respect to the eective costs of lifelong
learning expenditures in then +7%=( 6%)   1:2 with a 95% condence interval of
[ 2:8; 0:4].
6.2 Couples
Next, we consider the eects for couples. Within couples, we study the eects for the
partners with the highest gross income in the household or `primary earners' and the
eects for the partners with the lowest gross income in the household or `secondary
earners'. Furthermore, we present results for the declared amount and the own amount.
Because partners can shift the own schooling expenditures from one partner to the
other when they le their taxes, the eect on the declared amount and own amount
can dier. Indeed, we show that this makes a big dierence, and this underscores the
value of the rich data that we use in the analysis.
Figure 3a and 3b present graphical evidence on the role of bunching of taxable
income plus the lifelong learning deduction for primary earners around kink 1 and
kink 2, respectively. The gures provides clear evidence of bunching, and hence of
manipulation of the running variable near the kinks.16 Indeed, by shifting deductibles
(other than the lifelong learning expenditures deduction) from the secondary earner
to the primary earner, couples can reduce the tax burden of the household, up to the
point where the marginal tax rate of the primary earner is no longer higher than the
marginal tax rate of the secondary earner.17 This bunching will generate a bias in the
estimate when couples that are more likely to use the lifelong learning tax deduction
are also more likely to manipulate their income, which is likely to be the case. This
16The p-values for the McCrary density tests of no excess mass are all below 0.0001.
17The RD plots of the demographic control variables for primary earners also show discontinuous
jumps around kink 1 and kink 2, see Figure A5 in the appendix, again suggesting manipulation of
the running variable. Figure A9 in the appendix shows that there is no bunching around the kink
if we use gross income instead of taxable income, the income before applying any of the deductibles.
Figure A10 conrms that there are also no discontinuities in observable characteristics of primary
earners at the kink if we use gross income instead of taxable income. This shows that the bunching
that we nd in taxable income is due to shifting of deductibles.
22
Figure 3: Density around the cuto and declared deductible
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Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands. The regression lines are linear functions
without any control variables, with a separate intercept and slope on the right-hand side of the kink and using a donut
hole of 1000 euro on either side of the kink. The estimate of the discontinuity without demographic control variables is
presented above each gure.
is why we apply a donut hole to the sample included in the estimates in our preferred
specication. Furthermore, to have enough observations we include households with a
running variable plus and minus 5 thousand euro of the kink. For the large majority
of the sample to the right of the kink there is a xed dierence between the nancial
gain on the left-hand and on the right-hand side, i.e. a discontinuity rather than a
kink, and hence we estimate the eect using a donut regression discontinuity design.18
Figure 3c shows the take-up rate of the declared deduction by primary earners at
kink 1, which includes any lifelong learning expenditures that are shifted from the
secondary earner to the primary earner. There is a clear upward jump in the take-up
rate. Also for kink 2, we observe a signicant upward jump in the take-up rate, see
Figure 3d.19 Taken at face value, this would suggest a very large positive eect on the
take-up of lifelong learning of the tax deduction. However, for secondary earners we
then observe a counterintuitive decline in the take-up rate of the deduction for lifelong
learning expenditures to the right of kink, both for kink 1 and 2, see Figure 3e and 3f
respectively.
However, by using the declared schooling expenditures, the treatment eect con-
sists of the eect on the own lifelong learning expenditures by primary earners and
the shifting of lifelong learning expenditures from the secondary earner to the primary
earner. The second eect does not reect an actual increase in lifelong learning expen-
ditures, but rather a mere shift in the deducted amount between partners. Therefore,
next we consider the eect on the own (declared) lifelong learning expenditures.20
Figure 4a and 4b display much smaller jumps in the take-up rate of own lifelong
learning expenditures of primary earners at kink 1 and 2 than for the take-up rate
of declared lifelong learning expenditures. In Table 6 we present regression results.
Column (1) shows the coecient on the discontinuity, assuming the same linear rela-
tion between the take-up rate and income on the left-hand and right-hand side of the
kink. Column (2) adds a quadratic term and Column (3) allows for a dierent linear
relation on the right-hand side between the take-up rate and income. Columns (4)-(6)
18Similar to singles, gures A1c and A1d in the appendix show that marginal tax rates after ling
life-long learning expenditures are very similar for those above and below the kink.
19There is also a clear upward jump in the average amount deducted for kink 1 and 2, see Figure A2
in the appendix.
20We still need to apply a donut-RD design though, because manipulation of the income variable
still aects the composition of primary earners close to the kink. Note that the density of primary
earners by taxable income (including the declared lifelong learning expenditures) is still the same,
see Figure 3a and 3b, hence we only present graphs for the take-up rate and amount of own lifelong
learning expenditures.
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Figure 4: Own use of the deductible and own amount for primary earners
Kink 1 Kink 2
Own deductible
Estimate of the discontinuity: 0.0042 (0.0013)
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
−10000 −5000 0 5000 10000
Taxable income relative to the kink
n=498627
(a)
Estimate of the discontinuity: 0.0018 (0.0009)
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
−10000 −5000 0 5000 10000
Taxable income relative to the kink
n=756617
(b)
Own deducted amount
Estimate of the discontinuity: 6.3545 (2.3944)
0
40
80
12
0
16
0
−10000 −5000 0 5000 10000
Taxable income relative to the kink
n=498627
(c)
Estimate of the discontinuity: 7.8845 (2.7079)
0
40
80
12
0
16
0
−10000 −5000 0 5000 10000
Taxable income relative to the kink
n=756617
(d)
Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands. The regression lines are linear functions
without any control variables, with a separate intercept and slope on the right-hand side of the kink taking into account
a donut hole of 1,000 euro. The estimate of the discontinuity at the cuto presented above each gure takes into account
the donut hole.
Table 6: Treatment eect estimates for primary earners on the probability to use the
deductible and the deducted amount (euros) using dierent donut holes
Without controls With controls Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linear Quadratic Local linear Linear Quadratic Local linear
Kink 1
Panel A { Take-up rate of the deduction
Donut 1500 euro 0:0041 0:0040 0:0037 0:0032 0:0040 0:0037 444; 991
(0:0014) (0:0018) (0:0018) (0:0014) (0:0017) (0:0017)
Donut 1000 euro 0:0049 0:0045 0:0042 0:0042 0:0046 0:0042 498; 627
(0:0012) (0:0015) (0:0015) (0:0012) (0:0015) (0:0015)
Donut 500 euro 0:0042 0:0038 0:0038 0:0038 0:0041 0:0039 553; 066
(0:0009) (0:0010) (0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0010) (0:0009)
Donut 0 euro 0:0050 0:0053 0:0053 0:0051 0:0057 0:0057 624; 570
(0:0013) (0:0015) (0:0014) (0:0015) (0:0016) (0:0015)
Panel B { Deducted amount
Donut 1500 euro 5:4107 5:2795 5:5700 4:1866 5:3381 5:5644 444; 991
(2:1359) (2:8945) (2:8332) (2:1575) (2:9072) (2:8542)
Donut 1000 euro 5:6843 6:0792 6:2702 4:8075 6:2164 6:3304 498; 627
(1:8753) (2:8135) (2:8308) (1:8799) (2:8115) (2:8373)
Donut 500 euro 4:4841 4:5806 4:7594 3:9581 4:8480 4:9424 553; 066
(1:3746) (1:7221) (1:6641) (1:3673) (1:7095) (1:6607)
Donut 0 euro 4:9564 5:7033 5:9056 4:9354 6:2277 6:3219 624; 570
(2:8674) (3:1811) (2:7430) (3:1465) (3:3984) (2:8847)
Kink 2
Panel C { Take-up rate of the deduction
Donut 1500 euro  0:0002 0:0001 0:0002 0:0011 0:0013 0:0014 660; 928
(0:0016) (0:0016) (0:0016) (0:0016) (0:0016) (0:0015)
Donut 1000 euro 0:0014 0:0018 0:0018 0:0026 0:0029 0:0030 756; 617
(0:0011) (0:0011) (0:0010) (0:0011) (0:0010) (0:0010)
Donut 500 euro 0:0019 0:0022 0:0022 0:0032 0:0034 0:0034 854; 511
(0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007)
Donut 0 euro 0:0023 0:0088 0:0023 0:0038 0:0037 0:0036 970; 301
(0:0011) (0:0011) (0:0011) (0:0016) (0:0016) (0:0015)
Panel D { Deducted amount
Donut 1500 euro 4:1094 4:8658 4:9106 6:6603 7:3894 7:4165 660; 928
(3:5941) (3:5063) (3:4895) (3:5560) (3:4786) (3:4682)
Donut 1000 euro 7:2399 7:9263 7:9087 9:6271 10:2659 10:2346 756; 617
(2:7686) (2:7847) (2:8005) (2:7557) (2:7823) (2:8003)
Donut 500 euro 6:3917 6:7515 6:6859 8:8987 9:1924 9:1108 854; 511
(1:9854) (2:0319) (2:0471) (1:9828) (2:0335) (2:0461)
Donut 0 euro 6:3236 6:1236 5:8874 9:2013 8:7722 8:4473 970; 301
(2:4934) (2:4747) (2:3347) (3:3595) (3:2780) (3:0388)
Notes: Sample period 2006{2012. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by income bins of 100 euro in parentheses,
 p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1. All regressions include year xed eects. Columns (1)-(3) are without demographic
control variables, columns (4)-(6) are with demographic control variables. Columns (1) and (4) assume a linear relation
between taxable income and the dependent variable and allow for a discontinuity in the intercept. Columns (2) and
(5) assume a quadratic relation between taxable income and the dependent variable and allow for a discontinuity in the
intercept. Columns (3) and (6) assume a linear relation between taxable income and the dependent variable and allow
for a discontinuity in the intercept and in the linear relation between taxable income and the dependent variable. Full
estimation results for the preferred specication (column 6) with a donut hole of 1,000 euro can be found in Table A4 in
the appendix. Results without clustering standard errors are reported in Table A5 in the appendix.
correspond to Columns (1)-(3) but add demographic control variables. The eects on
the own take-up rate are still positive and also statistically signicantly dierent from
zero in our preferred specication, Column (6) using a donut hole of 1,000 euro. Panel
A shows that for kink 1 the treatment eect is +0.42 percentage points (+23.3%), and
Panel B shows that for kink 2 the treatment eect is +0.30 percentage points (+7.9%).
Again we can convert this into an elasticity of (declared own) lifelong learning expen-
ditures with respect to the eective costs of lifelong learning expenditures. At kink 2,
the eective costs are 11% lower on the right of the kink than on the left of the kink.21
This would suggest an elasticity at kink 2 of +7:9=( 11)   0:7.
Figure 4c and 4d show the eect on the average own amount deducted for primary
earners around kink 1 and 2, respectively. These gures also suggest a much smaller
eect than on the declared amount (compare with Figure A2 in the appendix), but still
a positive and signicant eect. Regression results are given in Table 6, Panel C and
D for kink 1 and 2 respectively. For our preferred specication, the treatment eect
for kink 1 is +6.3 euro (+28,8%) and for kink 2 it is +10.2 euro (+16.4%). At kink
2, the corresponding elasticity of (declared own) lifelong learning with respect to the
eective costs is +16:4=( 11)   1:5.
We also considered the treatment eect on the own lifelong learning expenditures
of secondary earners. The gures and regression table can be found in the appendix,
see Figure A3 and Table A1. For both kinks we nd a very small and statistically
insignicant eect, as opposed to the statistically signicant negative eects for the
declared deduction.
Overall, we have the most condence in the estimates for singles, where we do not
have manipulation of the running variable. For singles, at kink 1 in the tax system
we nd essentially no eect on the take-up of the lifelong learning deduction nor on
the average amount deducted. At kink 2 we nd a positive and statistically signicant
eect on the take-up rate and a positive and borderline signicant eect on the aver-
age amount deducted. The corresponding elasticity of the take-up rate and average
deducted amount with respect to the eective costs of lifelong learning at the point
estimate is  1:7 and  1:2, respectively. For primary earners we nd an elasticity of
the take-up rate of own lifelong learning expenditures and the average own amount
of lifelong learning expenditures with respect to the eective costs of lifelong learning
21The eective costs on the left-hand side are (1  0:42)  (2; 225  500) + 500 = 1; 500 euro, where
2,225 are the average own lifelong learning expenditures around kink 2. The eective costs on the
right-hand side are (1  0:52)  (2; 225  500) + 500 = 1; 328 euro.
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at the point estimate of  0:7 and  1:5, respectively. We nd very small and statisti-
cally insignicant eects for the take-up and average amount of own lifelong learning
expenditures by secondary earners. The eects on the take-up and average amount
of declared lifelong learning expenditures for primary earners are much larger and are
negative for secondary earners. However, shifting between partners is behind these
spurious large and counterintuitive results.
7 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have studied the eectiveness of a tax deduction for lifelong learning
expenditures in terms of the take-up rate of lifelong learning expenditures and the
average amount of lifelong learning expenditures. For singles, which is our preferred
group because they cannot manipulate the running variable, we nd heterogeneous
eects of the tax deduction. In the high-income group the take-up rate of lifelong
learning expenditures increases by 10%. The additional eect of the tax deduction at
a relatively low level of income is essentially zero however. Furthermore, the condence
intervals are tight, hence we can rule out large positive treatment eects. Note that
as we look at led expenditures, the estimated eect is likely to be an upper bound
of the eect on actual lifelong learning expenditures made. The higher marginal tax
rate to the right of the discontinuity also gives a larger nancial incentive to le the
expenditures to the right of the discontinuity, for a given level of expenditures made.
For couples, we initially nd large positive treatment eects for the take-up rate
and amount of the declared deduction for primary earners, and counterintuitive neg-
ative and statistically signicant treatment eects for secondary earners. However,
this is due to shifting of the lifelong learning expenditures from secondary earners to
primary earners. Indeed, when we consider the take-up rate of own lifelong learning
expenditures instead, we nd smaller eects for primary earners and a negligible eect
for secondary earners. However, manipulation of the running variable in couples is still
problematic, and our `solution' of applying donut-RD regressions, where we leave out
the bins with excess mass close to the discontinuity, has the downside of comparing
groups to the left and the right of the discontinuity that are increasingly dissimilar.
Hence, we prefer the estimates for singles to learn about the causal eect of the tax
deduction.
One question that remains is why a substantial tax incentive for lifelong learning
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has no impact on lifelong learning expenditures of low-income singles. One explanation
for why the eect is so small might have to do with frictions or salience (Ladner et al.,
2009; Chetty et al., 2013). People may encounter friction costs when ling lifelong
learning expenditures (e.g. keeping the receipts). However, people also report very
small expenditures on lifelong learning expenditures, see Figure A7 in the appendix,
and the proportion is similar for low- and high-income groups, suggesting that these
friction costs are very small. In general frictions are thus unlikely to play a major role
in our analysis.
Another explanation might be that the tax deduction is not very salient - individuals
might not know enough about its existence and eligibility. Indeed, Figure A7 shows
that some individuals le expenditures below the threshold (500 euro in 2012, 250 euro
in 2013), for which there is no nancial gain. This suggests that not all individuals are
fully aware of the details of the tax system. However, at the same time, we observe
clear bunching above the threshold, and apparently at least part of the lers is quite
aware of the rules of the tax deduction, and is also quick to respond to the change in
the threshold from 2012 to 2013.
Similar to other policies that aim to stimulate lifelong learning, we nd that the
deadweight loss is quite high for a tax deduction. Especially for the group of low-
income individuals, this might have to do with other costs associated with post-initial
education. Opportunity costs of substantial post-initial training are high, time con-
straints are considerable, especially when young children are present, many people -
particularly lower educated individuals - dislike formal learning and hence experience
psychic costs, and some people may be myopic or more generally underestimate the
gains of lifelong learning (see for example Heckman et al. (2006)).
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Figure A1: Average marginal tax rates in subsequent years for the sample around the
kink in 2006
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Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands.
Figure A2: Declared deducted amount for primary and secondary earners
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Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands. The regression lines are linear functions
without any control variables, with a separate intercept and slope on the right-hand side of the kink taking into account
a donut hole of 1,000 euro. The estimate of the discontinuity at the cuto presented above each gure takes into account
the donut hole.
Figure A3: Own use of the deductible and own amount for secondary earners
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Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands. The regression lines are linear functions
without any control variables, with a separate intercept and slope on the right-hand side of the kink taking into account
a donut hole of 1,000 euro. The estimate of the discontinuity at the cuto presented above each gure takes into account
the donut hole.
Figure A4: RKD plots for control variables for singles
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Notes: the regression lines are linear functions without any control variables.
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Figure A4: RKD plots for control variables for singles (cont.)
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Notes: the regression lines are linear functions without any control variables.
Figure A5: RD plots for control variables for the primary earner in a couple
Kink 1 Kink 2
Female
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
−10000 −5000 0 5000 10000
Taxable income relative to the kink
n=498627
(a)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
−10000 −5000 0 5000 10000
Taxable income relative to the kink
n=756617
(b)
Age
30
35
40
45
50
−10000 −5000 0 5000 10000
Taxable income relative to the kink
n=498627
(c)
30
35
40
45
50
−10000 −5000 0 5000 10000
Taxable income relative to the kink
n=756617
(d)
Notes: the regression lines are linear functions without any control variables, taking into account a
donut hole of 1,000 euro to the left and right of the kink.
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Figure A5: RD plots for control variables for the primary earner in a couple (cont.)
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Notes: the regression lines are linear functions without any control variables, taking into account a
donut hole of 1,000 euro to the left and right of the kink.
Figure A6: RD plots for control variables for the secondary earner in a couple
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Notes: the regression lines are linear functions without any control variables, taking into account a
donut hole of 1,000 euro to the left and right of the kink.
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Figure A6: RD plots for control variables for the secondary earner in a couple (cont.)
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Notes: the regression lines are linear functions without any control variables, taking into account a
donut hole of 1,000 euro to the left and right of the kink.
Figure A7: Own deducted amount in 2012 and 2013
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Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands.
Figure A8: Average deducted amount for those who take up the deduction
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Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands.
Table A1: Treatment eect estimates secondary primary earners on the probability to
use the deductible and the deducted amount (euros) using dierent donut holes
Without controls With controls Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linear Quadratic Local Linear Quadratic Local
linear linear
Kink 1
Panel A { Take-up rate of the deduction
Donut 1500 euro  0:0008 0:0012 0:0012  0:0018 0:0013 0:0012 444; 991
(0:0011) (0:0017) (0:0017) (0:0012) (0:0017) (0:0017)
Donut 1000 euro  0:0003 0:0010 0:0007  0:0008 0:0012 0:0009 498; 627
(0:0010) (0:0013) (0:0013) (0:0010) (0:0014) (0:0013)
Donut 500 euro 0:0000 0:0008 0:0006  0:0003 0:0011 0:0009 553; 066
(0:0008) (0:0010) (0:0010) (0:0008) (0:0010) (0:0010)
Donut 0 euro 0:0005 0:0013 0:0013 0:0007 0:0020 0:0019 624; 570
(0:0013) (0:0014) (0:0012) (0:0016) (0:0016) (0:0014)
Panel B { Deducted amount
Donut 1500 euro  2:6145  0:9536  1:0468  3:8541  0:8615  1:0158 444; 991
(2:2672) (3:3447) (3:2492) (2:2766) (3:3831) (3:2931)
Donut 1000 euro  2:1589  0:3692  0:3626  2:9122 0:0100  0:0662 498; 627
(1:7964) (2:4282) (2:3334) (1:8436) (2:4664) (2:3683)
Donut 500 euro 0:2842 2:0511 1:8645  0:0813 2:5715 2:2934 553; 066
(1:5644) (1:8637) (1:7838) (1:6450) (1:9031) (1:8161)
Donut 0 euro 1:1794 2:7829 2:6597 1:5290 3:8269 3:5936 624; 570
(2:0516) (2:1262) (1:8443) (2:4663) (2:4987) (2:1267)
Kink 2
Panel C { Take-up rate of the deduction
Donut 1500 euro  0:0016  0:0008  0:0008  0:0006 0:0001 0:0001 660; 928
(0:0018) (0:0016) (0:0016) (0:0017) (0:0016) (0:0015)
Donut 1000 euro  0:0001 0:0003 0:0002 0:0008 0:0012 0:0011 756; 617
(0:0012) (0:0012) (0:0012) (0:0012) (0:0012) (0:0012)
Donut 500 euro 0:0005 0:0008 0:0008 0:0015 0:0018 0:0017 854; 511
(0:0010) (0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0010) (0:0009) (0:0009)
Donut 0 euro 0:0010 0:0012 0:0012 0:0021 0:0022 0:0022 970; 301
(0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0012) (0:0012) (0:0012)
Panel D { Deducted amount
Donut 1500 euro  4:6525  4:0725  4:0050  2:7501  2:1733  2:1232 660; 928
(3:2716) (3:5188) (3:4989) (3:2642) (3:5187) (3:5050)
Donut 1000 euro  1:6134  1:2323  1:2399 0:1965 0:5499 0:5273 756; 617
(2:2687) (2:3877) (2:3788) (2:2757) (2:4061) (2:4001)
Donut 500 euro 0:3518 0:3819 0:2829 2:2895 2:2731 2:1584 854; 511
(1:7042) (1:7657) (1:7439) (1:7508) (1:8065) (1:7786)
Donut 0 euro 1:8676 1:9498 1:8870 4:0630 3:9716 3:8371 970; 301
(1:6805) (1:6670) (1:6318) (2:1608) (2:0930) (1:9981)
Notes: Sample period 2006{2012. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by income bins of 100 euro in parentheses,
 p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1. All regressions include year xed eects. Columns (1)-(3) are without demographic
control variables, columns (4)-(6) are with demographic control variables. Columns (1) and (4) assume a linear relation
between taxable income and the dependent variable and allow for a discontinuity in the intercept. Columns (2) and
(5) assume a quadratic relation between taxable income and the dependent variable and allow for a discontinuity in the
intercept. Columns (3) and (6) assume a linear relation between taxable income and the dependent variable and allow for
a discontinuity in the intercept and in the linear relation between taxable income and the dependent variable.
Table A2: Full estimation results for the preferred specication for singles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kink 1 (bandwidth 1,330) Kink 2 (bandwidth 2,000)
Deductible Deducted amount Deductible Deducted amount
Above the kink x taxable income  0:0014  2:4376 0:0038 5:8728
(0:0012) (2:3543) (0:0010) (3:8610)
Taxable income 0:0005 0:0336  0:0011  1:6255
(0:0007) (1:2078) (0:0006) (2:3984)
Controls
Age  0:0062  9:2879  0:0028  19:7179
(0:0003) (0:4486) (0:0004) (3:7302)
Age2 0:0001 0:0816 0:0000 0:1760
(0:0000) (0:0050) (0:0000) (0:0402)
Female 0:0037  1:1878 0:0222 34:9918
(0:0008) (1:4376) (0:0010) (3:6599)
Foreign 0:0016 2:6464 0:0045 24:0090
(0:0006) (1:0514) (0:0011) (4:9127)
Number of children  0:0035  5:8402  0:0021 0:5144
(0:0003) (0:5918) (0:0004) (2:2350)
Constant 0:1846 271:3887 0:1175 556:1877
(0:0065) (10:0242) (0:0097) (83:2903)
Observations 662,848 662,848 197,584 197,584
Notes: Sample period 2006{2012. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by income bins of 100 euro in
parentheses,  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1. Year xed eects included.
Table A3: Treatment eect estimates for singles on the probability to use the deductible
and the deducted amount (euros) using dierent bandwidths around the kink without
clustering standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Use of the deductible Deducted amount
No controls Controls No controls Controls Observations
Panel A. Kink 1
Bandwidth
500 0:0003 0:0007  7:9404  7:4324 247,482
(0:0046) (0:0046) (9:3599) (9:3302)
1,000 0:0006 0:0007  2:2945  2:3580 496,957
(0:0017) (0:0016) (3:4489) (3:4383)
1,33 0  0:0014  0:0014  2:4042  2:4376 662,848
(0:0011) (0:0011) (2:2193) (2:2130)
1,500  0:0006  0:0006  1:4232  1:5225 749,526
(0:0009) (0:0009) (1:8398) (1:8341)
2,000  0:0003  0:0002  0:7834  0:6823 999,693
(0:0006) (0:0006) (1:2147) (1:2108)
Panel B. Kink 2
Bandwidth
1,000  0:0021  0:0012  7:7869  5:0908 99,566
(0:0042) (0:0042) (16:2733) (16:2806)
1,500 0:0024 0:0024 4:5190 4:8451 148,526
(0:0023) (0:0023) (9:2539) (9:2401)
2,000 0:0038 0:0038 5:5721 5:8728 197,584
(0:0015) (0:0015) (6:2202) (6:1994)
2,500 0:0031 0:0032 7:8314 8:0554 246,949
(0:0011) (0:0011) (4:6452) (4:6343)
Notes: Sample period 2006{2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses,  p<0.01,  p<0.05,
 p<0.1. All regressions include year xed eects. The regressions with controls include gender,
ethnicity, age, age2 and the number of children in the household as demographic controls.
Table A4: Full estimation results for the preferred specication for primary earners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kink 1 (donut 1,000) Kink 2 (donut 1,000)
Deductible Deducted amount Deductible Deducted amount
Treatment eect 0:0042 6:3304 0:0030 10:2346
(0:0015) (2:0993) (0:0010) (2:8003)
Taxable income  0:0000  0:0013 0:0000 0:0001
(0:0000) (0:0007) (0:0000) (0:0005)
Above the kink x taxable income  0:0000 0:0009  0:0000  0:0011
(0:0000) (0:0007) (0:0000) (0:0008)
Controls
Age  0:0015  2:0001  0:0020  6:2648
(0:0002) (0:3381) (0:0002) (0:9853)
Age2 0:0000 0:0121 0:0000 0:0484
(0:0000) (0:0038) (0:0000) (0:0106)
Female 0:0027 3:0086 0:0146 22:4560
(0:0005) (0:7358) (0:0008) (1:8493)
Foreign 0:0029 2:2404 0:0107 21:2857
(0:0006) (0:9969) (0:0006) (1:6838)
Number of children  0:0008  1:2884  0:0018  4:7031
(0:0002) (0:3526) (0:0002) (0:5201)
Constant 0:0591 74:0780 0:0850 217:4642
(0:0042) (7:4935) (0:0052) (22:1930)
Observations 498,627 498,627 756,617 756,617
Notes: Sample period 2006{2012. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by income bins of 100 euro in
parentheses,  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1.. Year xed eects included.
Table A5: Treatment eect estimates for primary earners on the probability to use
the deductible and the deducted amount (euros) using dierent donut holes without
clustering standard errors
Without controls With controls Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linear Quadratic Local Linear Quadratic Local
linear linear
Kink 1
Panel A { Take-up rate of the deduction
Donut 1500 euro 0:0041 0:0040 0:0037 0:0032 0:0040 0:0037 444; 991
(0:0014) (0:0019) (0:0019) (0:0014) (0:0019) (0:0019)
Donut 1000 euro 0:0049 0:0045 0:0042 0:0042 0:0046 0:0042 498; 627
(0:0011) (0:0014) (0:0013) (0:0011) (0:0014) (0:0013)
Donut 500 euro 0:0042 0:0038 0:0038 0:0038 0:0041 0:0039 553; 066
(0:0009) (0:0010) (0:0010) (0:0009) (0:0010) (0:0010)
Donut 0 euro 0:0050 0:0053 0:0053 0:0051 0:0057 0:0057 624; 570
(0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007)
Panel B { Deducted amount
Donut 1500 euro 5:4107 5:2795 5:5700 4:1866 5:3381 5:5644 444; 991
(2:4923) (3:4702) (3:4619) (2:4954) (3:4673) (3:4591)
Donut 1000 euro 5:6843 6:0792 6:2702 4:8075 6:2164 6:3304 498; 627
(1:9149) (2:3231) (2:2676) (1:9122) (2:3207) (2:2652)
Donut 500 euro 4:4841 4:5806 4:7594 3:9581 4:8480 4:9424 553; 066
(1:5206) (1:7295) (1:6823) (1:5197) (1:7283) (1:6812)
Donut 0 euro 4:9564 5:7033 5:9056 4:9354 6:2277 6:3219 624; 570
(1:1217) (1:1722) (1:1383) (1:1214) (1:1742) (1:1401)
Kink 2
Panel C { Take-up rate of the deduction
Donut 1500 euro  0:0002 0:0001 0:0002 0:0011 0:0013 0:0014 660; 928
(0:0012) (0:0012) (0:0012) (0:0012) (0:0012) (0:0012)
Donut 1000 euro 0:0014 0:0018 0:0018 0:0026 0:0029 0:0030 756; 617
(0:0009) (0:0010) (0:0010) (0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0009)
Donut 500 euro 0:0019 0:0022 0:0022 0:0032 0:0034 0:0034 854; 511
(0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007)
Donut 0 euro 0:0023 0:0088 0:0023 0:0038 0:0037 0:0036 970; 301
(0:0006) (0:0006) (0:0006) (0:0006) (0:0006) (0:0006)
Panel D { Deducted amount
Donut 1500 euro 4:1094 4:8658 4:9106 6:6603 7:3894 7:4165 660; 928
(3:4039) (3:5743) (3:5732) (3:4037) (3:5741) (3:45728)
Donut 1000 euro 7:2399 7:9263 7:9087 9:6271 10:2659 10:2346 756; 617
(2:6620) (2:7973) (2:7972) (2:6633) (2:7978) (2:7974)
Donut 500 euro 6:3917 6:7515 6:6859 8:8987 9:1924 9:1108 854; 511
(2:0777) (2:1523) (2:1478) (2:0810) (2:1548) (2:1500)
Donut 0 euro 6:3236 6:1236 5:8874 9:2013 8:7722 8:4473 970; 301
(1:5485) (1:5879) (1:5832) (1:5559) (1:5934) (1:5882)
Notes: Sample period 2006{2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses,  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1. All regressions
include year xed eects. Columns (1)-(3) are without demographic control variables, columns (4)-(6) are with demographic
control variables. Columns (1) and (4) assume a linear relation between taxable income and the dependent variable and
allow for a discontinuity in the intercept. Columns (2) and (5) assume a quadratic relation between taxable income and
the dependent variable and allow for a discontinuity in the intercept. Columns (3) and (6) assume a linear relation between
taxable income and the dependent variable and allow for a discontinuity in the intercept and in the linear relation between
taxable income and the dependent variable.
Figure A9: Using gross income of the primary earner instead of taxable income shows
no bunching around the kink
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Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands.
Figure A10: Characteristics of primary earners with gross income relative to the kink
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Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands.
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Figure A10: Characteristics of primary earners with gross income relative to the kink
(cont.)
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Notes: Own calculations based on register data from Statistics Netherlands.

